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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000626-SC 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a state's appeal from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss charges of operation of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (1998); possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000);l and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998) (all attached in Add. 
A). 
^ i s statute has been amended since the date of the offense in this case. 
However, the amendments do not affect the subsection under which defendant was 
charged. Accordingly, the State cites herein to the most recent version of the statute. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in determining that 114 of the days which had passed 
since the filing of defendant's request for disposition under Utah's speedy trial statute 
were attributable to the State, thereby warranting dismissal of all charges under the Utah 
statute? 
The determination of whether various delays in bringing a defendant to trial toll 
the time for trying the defendant under Utah's speedy trial statute constitutes a legal 
question reviewed on appeal for correctness. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,914 
(Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below at (R. 39-47, 56-67, 93-95; 289:4-37). 
2. Alternatively, did the trial court commit plain error when it dismissed all three 
charges pending against defendant based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial right 
when defendant had invoked the speedy trial statute only as to one charge? 
This claim involves interpretation of a statute and, thus, presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, fl 1, 997 P.2d 314, cert, 
denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997). 
Because the State did not object to the dismissal of all three charges before the trial court, 
this Court will review the claim for plain error. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, [^56, 
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979 P.2d 799, reh'g denied (6/16/99). Plain error exists where an error occurs which is 
obvious and substantially prejudicial. Id 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), is relevant to the issues presented on appeal and 
is contained in its entirety in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying 
Utah's statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates 
and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows: 
Sept. 28, 1999 Defendant is arrested for: 1) operating a clandestine 
laboratory; 2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute; and 3) possess of drug paraphernalia (R. 4). 
Oct 13, 1999 The prosecutor authorizes the filing of charges (R. 289:11). 
Oct. 19, 1999 An information is filed charging defendant with: 1) operating 
a clandestine laboratory; 2) possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to distribute; and 3) possession of drug 
paraphernalia (R. 3-4). 
Oct. 27, 1999 Defendant makes his initial court appearance (R. 289:11). 
Oct. 28, 1999 Defendant executes a written document entitled "Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges(s) [sic]" 
[hereinafter "disposition request"] (R. 42) (in Add. C). The 
only charge listed on this document is "clandestine lab" (id.). 
Nov. 2, 1999 Defendant requests a preliminary hearing, asking that it be set 
thirty days from this date (R. 285:2; 289:11). Per defendant's 
disposition request, the hearing is set for November 30 (14; 
285:2; 289:11). 
4 
Nov. 15, 1999 The apparent date stamped on defendant's written disposition 
request as the date it was received by the Utah State Prison, 
Wasatch Records Division (R. 42; 289:10, 32). 
Nov. 30, 1999 The State appears in court ready for the preliminary hearing 
(R. 289:18, 20). Defendant's counsel notes a possible conflict 
of interest in counsel's representation of both defendant and 
his wife and obtains a continuance to December 21, 1999, to 
deal with it (R. 289:6-7, 11, 18-19). 
Dec. 6, 1999 Both the district attorney and the authorized agent at the 
prison receive defendant's written disposition request (R. 
289:11, 19). The prison agent prepares and signs a cover 
letter and sends copies of the documents to the Salt Lake 
District Attorney's Office and to the district court (R. 289:11). 
Dec. 21, 1999 The preliminary hearing is continued on defendant's motion 
to Jan. 20, 2000 (R. 19; 289:15, 33).2 
Jan. 20,2000 The preliminary hearing is begun (R. 21-23; 289:19). The 
hearing stops before it is completed because the judge has 
another appointment and because defendant wants to 
subpoena an additional witness (R. 289:19-20,28, 30-31). 
The court attempts to set the remainder of the hearing for 
February 1, but defense counsel is unavailable (R. 289:20-21). 
The next available date is February 24 (R. 289:21). 
Feb. 24, 2000 The remainder of the preliminary hearing is held, and 
defendant is bound over for trial on all charges (R. 32-35; 
289:15, 21). Arraignment is set for March 20, 2000 (R. 33, 
35; 289:21). 
2Because the thirty-day delay was granted on defendant's motion, the time would 
normally be counted against defendant and the running of the 120-day disposition period 
would be tolled. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). However, the 
prosecutor below accepted responsibility for this time period, and the trial court relied on 
that representation in making its calculation (R. 289:22-23, 33). Accordingly, the State 
does not seek on appeal to hold this thirty-day period against defendant. 
Mar. 20, 2000 Defendant appears in district court and requests a hearing date 
for his anticipated motion to suppress and motion to dismiss, 
the latter being based on an alleged violation of his statutory 
speedy trial rights (R. 36-37; 289:21-22). 
Mar. 24, 2000 Defendant files his "Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to a Filing of U.C.A. 77-29-1(1) 
Prisoner's Demand for Disposition of Pending Charge" (R. 
39-47). Defendant did not file the corresponding motion to 
dismiss, despite the trial court's direction that he do so (R.93). 
Mar. 27, 2000 Defendant files his motion to suppress (R. 48). 
May 15, 2000 A hearing on both motions is held (R. 93-94; 288:1-148; 289: 
1-37). The judge holds that six days remain of the 120-day 
period and notes that she cannot try the case within that time 
(R. 93; 289: 33-34, 36-37). She holds that unless the State 
has the case brought before another judge within six days, she 
will dismiss the charges with prejudice (R. 93; 289: 36-37). 
May 23, 2000 An order of dismissal is entered (R. 95-96). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Acting pursuant to a tip from the manager of the Quality Inn and Suites in Sandy, 
Utah, and armed with an outstanding warrant for the arrest of the renter of room #310, 
Jamie Brett Coleman, Officer Eddie Christensen knocked on the door of room #310 and 
announced himself as a police officer (R. 4-5; 289:20). Jamie Coleman answered the 
door, stepping into the hallway to speak to the officer (R. 5). Officer Christensen told her 
thatshe was under arrest, and Officer Keri Geer accompanied Coleman back into the 
room so that the latter could get dressed (id,). Officer Geer immediately noticed in plain 
view marijuana and several items and chemicals commonly found in methamphetamine 
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laboratories (id.). Consequently, the officers also arrested the other occupant of the room, 
defendant Larry Dean Coleman (id.). Pursuant to written permission from Jamie, the 
officers thereafter searched the room, finding various chemicals and precursors capable of 
producing methamphetamine, twenty-four grams of finished methamphetamine, and a bag 
of marijuana (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Once an incarcerated defendant has properly delivered a written request 
for disposition of charges to custodial authorities at the prison, the prosecutor must bring 
defendant to trial within 120 days or suffer dismissal of the charges identified in the 
disposition request. The time period may be tolled or temporarily waived by defendant or 
extended for "good cause" as determined by the trial court. 
In this case, the trial court held that as of the time of the hearing on defendant's 
motion to dismiss for violation of his statutory speedy trial right, only six days remained 
in the 120-day period under the statute. As she could not set the trial within six days, and 
the prosecutor was unsuccessful in her attempts to find a judge able to do so, the trial 
judge dismissed the charges against defendant upon expiration of the remaining six days. 
However, in computing the elapsed time in this case, the trial court erroneously attributed 
to the State forty days of delay. Because the full time period had not elapsed as of entry 
of the ruling below, defendant's statutory speedy trial right had not been violated and 
dismissal was inappropriate. 
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Point II: Alternatively, should this Court find that the district court properly 
computed the elapsed time, it should affirm dismissal of the "clandestine lab" charge 
expressly mentioned in defendant's written disposition request but reverse the dismissal 
of the remaining two charges, inasmuch as defendant failed to invoke the statute as to 
those charges. The burden is on the defendant to properly invoke the statute before the 
time period will commence, and the statute expressly provides that it is invoked upon 
delivery to the custodial officials of "a written demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). As defendant's written disposition request 
referenced only the "clandestine lab" charge, it was plain error for the trial court to 
dismiss all three charges pending against defendant because he had failed to invoke the 
statute as to two of them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DISMISSAL WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
MISCALCULATED THE ELAPSED TIME, ERRONEOUSLY 
ATTRIBUTING TO THE STATE SEVENTEEN DAYS PROPERLY 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEFENDANT AND TWENTY-THREE DAYS 
JUSTIFIED BY GOOD CAUSE 
The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss because the court 
miscalculated the time which had elapsed prior to the granting of the motion. Instead of 
having six days remaining in the 120-day statutory period, as the trial court found, the 
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State had forty-six days in which it could still bring defendant to trial under the relevant 
state statute (R. 289:32-37) (in Add. D).3 
The trial court's granting of defendant's motion to dismiss was based on its legal 
conclusion that only twenty-one of the days which passed between delivery of 
defendant's disposition request to the prison authorities and the filing of his motion to 
suppress were attributable to defendant and therefore tolled the 120-day period.4 The 
determination of whether various delays in bringing a defendant to trial toll the time for 
bringing the matter to trial under Utah's speedy trial statute constitutes a legal question 
reviewed on appeal for correctness. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998). 
Utah's disposition of detainers statute is designed to promote the prompt 
prosecution of charges against prisoners, to ensure trial while witnesses are available and 
memories are fresh, and to more precisely define "speedy trial" as it applies under our 
3Defendant relied exclusively on his statutory speedy trial right below. 
Accordingly, this Court need not address the right under the State or U.S. Constitutions. 
4To clarify the periods of conflict targeted by the State's argument, counsel has 
attached in Addendum E a chart identifying the trial court's computation below and the 
State's proposed computation and clearly illustrating the two periods challenged in this 
appeal. 
Further, because defendant never filed a written motion to dismiss, and his motion 
to suppress was heard at the same time as his motion to dismiss, the State uses the filing 
of his motion to suppress as the date which finally tolled the running of the disposition 
period. See State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325,1329-30 (Utah 1986) (the filing of a motion 
to dismiss for a speedy trial violation tolls the running of the disposition period); State v. 
Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) (any delay occasioned by defendant 
constitutes a temporary waiver of his statutory speedy trial right and does not count 
toward the disposition period). 
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state constitution. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson. 22 
Utah 2d 361,453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969) (addressing purpose of previous version of 
statute). The statute outlines the responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a 
speedy resolution of charges. While the prosecution carries the ultimate burden of 
bringing the matter to trial within 120 days of the filing of a disposition request, 
defendant has the threshold burden of ensuring that the statute is properly invoked. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16 (when a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the 
statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the matter heard in 120 days; 
120 days does not start until notice is properly delivered under the statute); State v. 
Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991) (describing prosecutor's burden); State v. 
Wright 745 P.2d 447,450-51 (Utah 1987) (the disposition request must be properly sent 
to the right people and contain an appropriate demand to be effective); Viles. 702 P.2d at 
1175 (the burden is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to have 
charges disposed of in the statutory period); Wilson. 453 P.2d at 160 (describing 
prosecutor's burden). Moreover, once a defendant has properly invoked the statute to 
start the 120-day period running and to shift the burden to the prosecution to ensure a 
timely trial, he must not unduly delay matters or the delay may be charged against him 
and the 120-day period extended. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 916; State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 
11325,1329-30 (Utah 1986); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). Further, 
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the disposition period may be extended for "good cause." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) 
and (4). 
The State does not challenge the trial court's decision to begin counting at 
November 15, 1999-the date stamped on defendant's written disposition request by the 
Utah State Prison records department as the date they received the disposition request.5 
In fact, the majority of the trial court's computation was correct. However, the 
computation is incorrect at three points: 1) the three days between March 27 and 30, 2000 
(R. 48; 289:33, 35); 2) the fourteen-day period between November 15 and 30, 1999 (R. 
289:32); and 2) the twenty-three-day period between February 1 and 24, 2000 (R. 
289:33). 
The first miscalculation was a simple mistake on the part of the trial court. The 
trial court believed that defendant filed his motion to dismiss on March 30,2000 (R. 
289:35). However, defendant never filed a written motion to dismiss. Instead, he filed a 
memorandum "supporting" a motion to dismiss on March 24,2000, and he filed a motion 
to suppress evidence along with a supporting memorandum on March 27, 2000 (R. 39-47, 
48-55). The hearing on May 15,2000, encompassed both the dismissal and suppression 
issues (R. 288:1-148; 289: 1-37). The filing of the memorandum supporting the dismissal 
motion, even without the motion itself, arguably tolled the disposition period. See 
5The record does not contain any explanation for the subsequent twenty-one day 
delay in forwarding the necessary information to the district attorney and the district 
court. 
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Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914 (delay caused by defendant will be held against him); Banner. 
717 P.2d at 1329-30 (same); Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 116 (same). However, the filing of 
the motion to suppress definitely delayed the proceedings and tolled the time period. See 
Heaton. 958 P.2d at 914; Banner. 717 P.2d at 1329-30; Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 116. 
Hence, the trial court should have used March 27, if not March 24, in its calculations, and 
at least the three days between March 27 and 30 should not have been counted against the 
State. 
The court's second miscalculation occurred because defendant filed his disposition 
request during a period of delay attributable to himself. The trial court began its 
calculation from the date the request was delivered rather than from the end of the delay 
period. The time period under the speedy trial statute commences upon proper delivery of 
the written disposition request to the custodial authorities. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); 
Viles. 702 P.2d at 1176. The trial court found that to be November 15, 1999, which 
would normally mean that the disposition calculations would start November 16 (R. 
289:32). However, at that time, the case was already in a period of delay caused by 
defendant's actions in court on November 2. At a hearing on November 2, defendant not 
only requested a preliminary hearing, but expressly requested that it be set thirty days 
away, instead of allowing it to be set within the ten-day period provided by rule 7(g)(2), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 14; 285:2; 289:11). The preliminary hearing was 
then set for November 30, and no reason for the late setting appears on the record except 
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defendant's express request (id.). As the hearing would have been set on or before 
November 12 under normal circumstances, the delay between November 12 and 30 
should be attributed to defendant. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914; Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 
116. Consequently, the entire fifteen-day period between November 15th, when the 120 
days commenced, and November 30th, when the preliminary hearing was scheduled to 
occur, should be tolled. See Heaton. 958 P.2d at 914. 
Finally, the trial court improperly counted against the State a twenty-three-day 
delay incurred to accommodate defense counsel's schedule. The period between 
February 1 and February 24, 2000, was attributable to "good cause" and, hence, should 
have tolled the disposition period. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) and (4). The reason 
why these twenty-three days should not be counted against the State relates to events of 
January 20, 2000. The preliminary hearing began on that date but was not completed (R. 
21-23; 289:19-20, 28, 30-31). The matter was continued for two reasons: 1) the trial judge 
had another commitment that afternoon; and 2) defense counsel wanted to subpoena an 
officer who was not present on that date (R. 289:19-20, 28, 30-31). The judge proposed 
continuing the hearing until February 1, the next available date on the court's calendar (R. 
289:20-21). However, defense counsel was unavailable on that date (id.). The next date 
available to both the court and defense counsel was February 24 (R. 289:21). 
Consequently, although the preliminary hearing was continued in part due to a 
commitment of the judge, it occurred twenty-three days later than necessary solely to 
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accommodate defense counsel's schedule. Hence, the delay constitutes "good cause" 
under section 77-29-1(3) and (4) and should not be counted in the disposition calculation. 
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 ("extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the 
disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good 
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)"); State v. Bonnv. 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970) 
(setting the trial outside the statutory period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule 
was "entirely reasonable and practical"). 
The trial court calculated that 114 days of the disposition period had passed at the 
time of the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 289:33). The three time periods 
challenged by the State amount to forty days. If these days were properly excluded from 
the trial court's calculation, the elapsed time would have amounted to 74 days, leaving 46 
days in which to bring defendant to trial under the statute. As the full 120 days had not 
elapsed, dismissal was not appropriate. The trial court's dismissal should be reversed and 
the case remanded for further proceedings.6 
Alternatively, this Court need not agree with the State's calculation in its entirety 
in order to reverse and remand this matter. The first of the three periods of miscalculation 
was simply a mistake on the part of the trial court as to the filing of defendant's motion. 
While both of the remaining periods of delay were justified by "good cause" or were 
caused by defendant and, hence, should be held against him and used to toll the running 
of the 120-day disposition period, this Court need only agree with one or the other of 
these periods, as either one is sufficient by itself to warrant reversal of the dismissal order 
and a remand for further proceedings. The shortest of these two periods, added to the six 
days remaining under the trial court's calculation, leaves the State twenty days in which to 
bring defendant to trial. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial could not 
have occurred within that period of time. 
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POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY 
DISMISSING TWO CHARGES WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN 
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN DISPOSITION REQUEST 
Should this Court determine that the trial court properly calculated the disposition 
period, it should nevertheless examine the scope of the dismissal order. The trial court 
committed plain error in dismissing all three of the charges pending against defendant 
based on violation of the speedy trial statute. Defendant invoked the statute only as to 
one charge. As the statute was not properly invoked as to the remaining two charges, the 
State should be free to pursue them against defendant. 
Because the prosecutor failed to raise this issue below, it is reviewed on appeal for 
plain error. To establish plain error, the State must show that "(0 an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42,120, 395 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
Section 77-29-1(1) details the steps defendant must take to properly invoke the 
statute: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the 
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition 
of the pending char2e. he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
15 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
(Emphasis added) (in Add. B). 
The plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires that in order for a 
defendant's written disposition request to be effective, it must expressly include: 1) the 
nature of the charge; 2) the court in which the charge is pending; and 3) a request for 
disposition "of the pending charge . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). Defendant 
submitted a written disposition notice, entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charges'* (R. 42). The notice was pre-printed with various blanks filled in by 
defendant. That notice provides: 
NOTICE is hereby given that I, Larrv Coleman, do hereby request final 
disposition of any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in the State of 
Utah. Charges of clandestine lab are now pending against me in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake, [sic] County, and request is hereby made that you forward this 
notice to the appropriate authorities in that county, together with such other 
information as required by law. 
(R. 42, underlined phrases are blanks filled in by defendant) (attached in Add. C). 
Defendant had in fact been charged with operating a clandestine laboratory prior to the 
filing of his disposition request (R. 3-4). However, he was also charged with possession 
of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia (id.). Defendant's failure to 
14 
even mention the remaining two charges in his written disposition request prevents 
application of section 77-29-1 to those charges. See, e.g.. Aranza v. State, 213 Ga.App. 
192, 193, 444 S.E.2d 349, 350 (Ga.App. 1994) (defendant's demand, which failed to 
identify the charges upon which he demanded a speedy trial by name, date, term of court, 
or case number "cannot reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on 
notice of a defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction" of dismissal; hence the 
time never commenced), cert, denied (9/8/94); see also Cummins v. State. 202 Ga.App. 
155, 155-56, 413 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ga.App. 1992) (same), cert, denied (1/10/92): Ferris v. 
State. 172 Ga.App. 729, 731, 324 S.E.2d 762, 764-65 (Ga.App. 1984) (same). 
The only description of the nature of the charges defendant sought to include in his 
written disposition request is the phrase "clandestine lab." The phrase "clandestine lab" 
does nothing to identify the remaining charges, let alone impart the nature of those 
charges, and it gives no notice of defendant's desire to have the remaining charges 
promptly disposed of. On the contrary, the fact that defendant specified only one of three 
charges seems to suggest he did not care about speedy disposition of the remaining two 
charges. Those charges were viable independent of the State's ability to establish the 
existence of the clandestine lab. The simple fact that all the offenses were discovered at 
the same time and charged in the same information does not relieve defendant of his 
burden of identifying the nature of each pending charge in order to impose upon the State 
the burden of complying with the speedy trial statute. Neither is defendant relieved of that 
17 
burden by the presumption that the prosecutor knew of the existence of the charges. Cf. 
Wright 745 P.2d at 451 (letter from defense counsel to the county attorney inquiring 
about prosecution of defendant did not trigger section 77-29-1 because, among other 
things, the letter did not "specify the charges, as required by section 77-29-1(1)."); Viles, 
702 P.2d at 1176 (a notice of appearance filed by defendant's counsel, including a plea of 
"not guilty" and a request that defendant be granted a trial upon the charge, was not 
sufficient to meet the requirements for invoking section 77-29-1 because, among other 
things, it "did not specify the nature of the charge"). 
Because the entire prosecution lies in the balance under this statute, strict 
compliance by defendant with the minimal requirements to trigger the statute should be 
required. Defendant need only provide a minimum of readily-available information in 
writing to his custodial authorities, who then are responsible for adding additional 
information and actual delivery of the disposition request to the appropriate entities. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1; Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915-16; Wright 745 P.2d at 450-51; Viles, 
702 P.2d at 1175. Charges must be pending before defendant may invoke the statute, 
making it easy for the defendant to identify the nature of the pending charges and the 
court having jurisdiction- Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). There is no need for any entity 
involved in the prosecution or management of the case to have to guess as to the scope of 
the disposition request. 
18 
In this case, defendant submitted his written disposition request after the charges 
were filed and after he had been appointed counsel (R. 3-4, 11,, 42). He was in the best 
position possible to determine and include in his disposition request all the charges he 
intended to submit to this expedited process. It is not unduly burdensome to require 
under these circumstances that proper invocation include, at a minimum, identifying each 
pending charge defendant intends the disposition request to cover, especially as the 
penalty for the State's failure to act promptly under the statute is extreme-dismissal with 
prejudice of all identified pending charges. 
Because the disposition request unnecessarily and unjustifiably fails to name two 
of the three charges pending against defendant, let alone identify the nature of those 
charges, the statute was not properly invoked as to those charges. The error in dismissing 
the two charges was obvious given the express language of both the statute and the 
disposition request, and it was prejudicial in that it prevented further prosecution on both 
of the unnamed charges. Accordingly, dismissal of those two charges should be reversed 
and proceedings allowed to continue as to them. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order dismissing the charges against defendant, in whole or in part, and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisr 7 / day of December, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee was mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Joan C. Watt and James A. 
Valdez, Salt Lake Public Defender Assoc, attorneys for defendant/appellee, 424 East 500 







REPLACEMENT VOLUME 6A 
1998 EDITION 
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume. 
Edited by 
the Publisher's Editorial Staff 
LEXIS Publishing 
LEXIS*NEXIST. MARTINDALE HUBBELL* 
MATTHEW BENDER* • tMCHtt- SHEPARCTS* 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as denned 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations, or 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to 
(1) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony, 
(u) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony, or 
(in) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb) 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2) 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Kb)(i), (n), or (in), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXn) or (2)(a)(iii) is 
d) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(n) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
(m) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally 
d) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
cuntrolled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person, 
(n) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address, 
(m) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued oi written under the terms of this chapter, or 
dv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher 
naha Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed 
(l) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools, 
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti 
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions, 
(in) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (n), 
dv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility, 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center, 
(vi) in a church or synagogue, 
(vn) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto, 
(vm) in a public parking lot or structure, 
dx) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(aXi) through (vni), or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have hpen established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended and the person is not eligible for 
probation 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age, nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to ind 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorize d by 
law 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 8; 1972, ch. 22, penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignat-
ft 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985, ing the other subsections accordingly. 
ch. 146, ft 1; 1966, ch. 196, ft 1; 1967, ch. 92, The 1999 amendment by ch 12, effective May 
ft 100; 1967, ch. 190, ft 3; 1966, ch. 95, ft 1; 3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence 
1969, ch. 50, ft 2; 1969, ch. 56, ft 1; 1969, ch.
 0r for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made 
176, ft 1; 1969, ch. 187, ft % 1969, ch. 201, ft 1; minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and 
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
 ( 4 ) . 
? h : ^ J ^ " J i i ^ J ^ L i i ! l ? 1 ^ I9?* The 1 9 9 9 amendment by ch 303, effective 
i J i i * M L \ u \ * 1 ^ 2 l **** 3 ' 1999> a d d e d Subsection UXO, redesig-
X f t ^ L i t ^ r t Z i l i * < 2 M - « • * * fo™er Subsection (1XO as (IXd), sub-139, ft 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, ft 1.
 8 t , t u t ^ ^ in Subsec-
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amend- 8 t l t u t e d ctia^T l o r s u c t i o n *» ***** 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former 
tion (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic 
Subsection (6) which read "Any person who fif^6' , , , 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense ^ ^ h " s?*1 0 1 1 lfl • * °J* M reconciled by the 
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction ° f f i c e « "*wlat ive Research and General 
guilty of one degree less than the maximum Counsel. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
{V> It is unlawful fox any peisoii to us*, OT te possess ^ \th v&tent \x> v&% di-ug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violatioo of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L» 1981, ch* 7«* I & Cfoss-References, — '"•entencina; for felo-
Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this niest §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, H 1 to 6, which Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
enacted §J 58-37a-l to 58-37a-«. 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony, 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
History: C. 1963, 58-37d-4, enacted by L. (IXf) and (g) and made atyiistic changes accord-
1994, ch. 156, S 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11. ingiy. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Croee-Referencee. — Sentencing for felo-
ment, effective May 5t 1997, added Subsections nies, §S 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
ADDENDUM B 
77-29-1. Prisoner 'a demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History: C. 1963, 77-29-1, enacted by L. Croat-References. — Right to speedy trial 
1980, ch, 15, § 2. Utah Const, Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6. 
ADDENDUM C 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF 
PENDING CHARGES(S) 
TO: FREDERICK VANDERVEUR, DIRECTOR 
UTAH STATE PRISON/CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
NOTICE i s hereby given that I, 
do hereby request final disposition of any charge(s) now pending 
against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charges of 
f /am?*< Tin e / a t are now pending against me in the 
TnifJ f)!<fffe[ Court, fe/T^/fc , County, and 
request is hereby made that you forward this notice to the 
appropriate a u t h o r i t i e s in that county, together with such other 
information as required by law. 
DATED thia& 2$ date of . 
v& irmnm/^ZtAf' S^Z^^r? USP0 2$67& ^ I '(Signature) 
I herefav certify that I received a copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
this T day of _ 
Au thori zed ^Agen t . 
Utah State Prison /. * 
Draper, Utah //-. f f f t r ' a 
ADDENDUM D 
cjCj j 9 -xoQ> £x F
^ s w 
IN- THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
m 1 4 2QQQ 
* * * 
ORIGINAL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JAMIE BRETT COLEMAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. CR-99-1920661 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. CR-99-1920662 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
MAY 15, 2000 
REPORTED BY: EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
0028H 
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CASE THAT I HAD. 
THE COURT: BUT YOU FILED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
MR. VALDEZ: I DID FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS. AND 
WE TOLD THE COURT ON THE DAY THAT WE WERE FILING THE MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS --
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. VALDEZ: --ON THE DAY THAT WE WERE HERE FOR 
ARRAIGNMENT. IN FACT, SHE KNEW FROM THE DAY THAT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING WENT THAT WE WERE GOING TO FILE A MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS. AND WE INDICATED THAT WE NEEDED THAT OTHER 
WITNESS, AN ESSENTIAL WITNESS, AND I THINK IT'S OFFICER GEER, 
BECAUSE WE INTEND TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS. AND THAT WAS 
BACK ON THE 20TH OF JANUARY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THIS IS WHAT I'M 
CALCULATING IN TERMS OF TIME PERIODS. 
FIRST, THE DEFENDANT FILED HIS 120-DAY DISPOSITION 
PAPERS ON OCTOBER 28TH. I'M FINDING THAT THE OPERATIVE DATE 
TO BEGIN CALCULATING THE 120-DAY PERIOD IS NOVEMBER 16TH. 
AND THAT IS GIVING THE BENEFIT, FRANKLY, TO THE STATE PRISON. 
ONCE IT'S AT LEAST LOGGED IN TO THE STATE, THE PRISON 
RECORDS, IT'S THE DUTY OF THE PRISON TO MOVE IT IMMEDIATELY 
FORWARD. SO THAT'S THE DATE I'M STARTING FROM, BETWEEN 
NOVEMBER 16TH AND NOVEMBER 30TH. IT'S A 14-DAY PERIOD THAT 
IS PART OF THE, THAT I'M CALCULATING AS PART OF THIS 120-DAY 
PERIOD. 
33 
I AM NOT, I AM TOLLING IT FOR THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER 
3 0TH UNTIL DECEMBER 21ST BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT WITH 
ATTORNEYS. 
CONSISTENT WITH THE STATE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THE NEXT 30 DAYS, DECEMBER 21ST TO JANUARY 20TH, THAT IS 
ADDED TO THE 120-DAY PERIOD. 
FURTHER, I AM ADDING THE TIME BETWEEN JANUARY 20TH 
AND MARCH 20TH WHICH I CALCULATE TO BE 60 DAYS. IT DOESN'T 
MATTER IF IT'S THE COURT OR IF IT'S THE STATE, IT NEEDS TO GO 
FORWARD. AND THERE'S NO REASON FOR ME NOT TO COUNT THOSE 60 
DAYS. 
I AM ALSO COUNTING AN ADDITIONAL 10 DAYS BETWEEN 
MARCH 20TH AND MARCH 30TH. AND MY CALCULATION IS THAT AS OF 
TODAY WE'RE AT 114 DAYS. CLEAR ON MY CALCULATIONS? 
I THINK THE MOTION, I FIND THAT THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS DOES STAY BECAUSE THAT IS A DEFENDANT'S CHOICE, AND 
YOU CERTAINLY HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
BECAUSE OF THAT, TO HAVE THAT BE ADDED TO THE 120 DAYS 
DOESN'T MAKE SENSE. I THINK THERE'S GOOD CAUSE TO TOLL THAT 
120 DAYS ON DEFENDANT'S FILING OF THAT MOTION. 
SO WE'RE SIX DAYS OUT. AND I AM NOT GOING TO BE 
ABLE TO TRY THIS CASE IN A SIX-DAY PERIOD, SIX DAYS. IS THE 
STATE OR MR. VALDEZ? I MEAN, UNLESS WE GO TO TRIAL TOMORROW 
AND I DENY THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS I CAN'T DO IT. AND I HAVE 
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MAYBE IF WE CAN GO THROUGH THE 
WE'RE GOING TO GO 11/16? 
11/30 IS 14 DAYS. JANUARY 20TH --
11/16 TO WHAT PERIOD? 
11/30. 
SO EVEN THOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL REQUESTS 
TO THE PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT PERIOD 
UNTIL DECEMBER 6TH? 
NO. 
OKAY. AND HOW MANY --
THE DATE WE'RE STARTING FROM IS NOVEMBER 
OKAY. 
THERE'S FOURTEEN DAYS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 
• 1 
OKAY. AND THEN IT TOLLS FROM THE 3 0TH? 
30TH TO DECEMBER 21ST. 
OKAY. 
IT CONTINUES FROM DECEMBER 21ST TO 
JANUARY 20TH, WHICH IS 30 DAYS. SO WE ARE NOW AT 44 DAYS. 




EVEN THOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL REQUESTED A 
WELL, THE CASE WAS TRIED THAT DAY, IT 
WAS TRIED, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HELD THAT DAY AND ON 
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MARCH 20TH. BECAUSE THE COURT COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE THAT AT 
ATTORNEY'S REQUEST DOES NOT MEAN IT TOLLS IT. I MEAN, THE 
COURT IS RESPONSIBLE TO MOVE THE CASES FORWARD TOO AND SO I 
DON'T FIND ANY BASIS FOR TOLLING THE 120-DAY PERIOD BETWEEN 
THOSE TWO DATES. AND THAT IS 60 DAYS, JANUARY 20TH TO 
FEBRUARY 20TH, 29; FROM FEBRUARY 20TH TO MARCH 20TH. AND THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS FILED ON MARCH 30TH, 10 DAYS LATER. I 
AM TOLLING IT SUBSEQUENT TO THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. THAT'S 
114 DAYS. 
I CAN'T PLACE ANY WEIGHT ON COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS 
BETWEEN PROSECUTING AGENCIES. THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE WAS 
GIVEN. 
MS. BEATON: THE STATE'S READY TO TRY IT, AND WITHIN 
THE NEXT SIX DAYS IF WE NEED TO. 
THE COURT: HOW MANY DAYS DO YOU NEED? 
MS. BEATON: I CAN TRY HIM IN SIX. I'LL BE READY TO 
GO. I WOULD RATHER DO THAT THAN DISMISS A FIRST DEGREE CLAN 
LAB. 
THE COURT: ONE DAY, TWO DAYS? 
MS. BEATON: TWO. 
MR. VALDEZ: I THINK THREE DAYS FOR A CLAN LAB. AND 
IT'S GOING TO REQUIRE -- IT'S GOING TO BE A TRIAL OF 
CO-DEFENDANTS, I SUPPOSE. THERE HASN'T BEEN A MOTION TO 
SEVER. 
THE COURT: WELL, I CAN'T TRY THIS CASE WITHIN THE 
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NEXT SIX DAYS. 
MR. VALDEZ: I MOVE TO DISMISS THEN. 
MS. BEATON: THE STATUTE ALLOWS FOR CONTINUANCES TO 
BE GRANTED UPON GOOD CAUSE. THAT'S WHAT SAVED THE HEATON 
CASE. 
THE COURT: BUT I CAN'T FIND THERE'S GOOD CAUSE. 
WE'RE AT THE 11TH AND-A-HALF HOUR HERE AND THERE WERE MONTHS. 
MS. BEATON: THE ONLY CASE THAT WE'RE LOOKING AT IN 
TERMS OF WHAT MR. VALDEZ WANTS THIS COURT TO LOOK AT IS THE 
HEATON CASE. THERE IS THE MAESTAS CASE. AND THE COURT SAYS, 
BASICALLY, IF THE DEFENDANT FILED A 120-DAY DISPOSITION BUT 
THEN HIS ACTIONS WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO DO 
OTHER THINGS, ANY ACTIONS THAT HE TAKES THEN THE COURT CAN 
DETERMINE THAT THE 120 DAYS HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN WAIVED. AND 
I'M LOOKING AT --
MR. VALDEZ: YOU KNOW --
MS. BEATON: JUST SO WE CAN BE SPECIFIC. 
MR. VALDEZ: HOW LONG ARE WE GOING TO ALLOW HER TO 
ARGUE THE CASE, YOUR HONOR? I THINK BOTH PARTIES HAVE HAD A 
CHANCE TO ARGUE THE CASE. THE COURT, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAS 
MADE A DECISION, THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE 
COULD BE TRIED IN SIX DAYS. AND WHERE, I SUPPOSE. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. OKAY. AS OF ONE WEEK FROM TODAY 
I'M GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE. IF YOU CAN GET 
SOMEONE TO TRY IT THIS WEEK GO AHEAD AND TRY IT. BUT I CAN'T 
1 DO IT. AND I'LL WAIT FOR THE 12 0 DAYS TO RUN. BUT YOU KNOW 
2 THAT'S A REQUEST THAT I CAN'T ACCOMMODATE, PERIOD, WITH MY 
3 SCHEDULE. 
4 MR. VALDEZ: I GUESS I BETTER STICK AROUND FOR THE 
5 MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
6 THE COURT: YEP. ALL RIGHT. HOW MANY -- AND, 
7 MR. VALDEZ, YOU'LL PREPARE THAT ORDER? 
8 MR. VALDEZ: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
9 I (WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
10 
11 I * * * 
12 
13 
14 I MR. VALDEZ: MR. SCOWCROFT REPRESENTS THE 
15 CO-DEFENDANT. 
16 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HOW MANY WITNESSES DO YOU 
17 HAVE ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS? 
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